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In most settings, it is difficult to measure discrimination, and even more challenging to
distinguish between competing theories of discrimination (taste-based versus information-based).
Using contestant voting behavior on the television game show Weakest Link, one can in principle
empirically address both of these questions. On the show, contestants answer questions and vote off
other players, competing for a winner-take-all prize. In early rounds, strategic incentives encourage
voting for the weakest competitors. In later rounds, the incentives reverse, and the strongest
competitors become the logical target. Controlling for other observable characteristics including the
number of correct answers thus far, both theories of discrimination predict that in early rounds,
excess votes will be made against groups targeted for discrimination. In later rounds, however, taste-
based models predict continued excess votes, whereas statistical discrimination predicts fewer votes
against the target group. Empirically, I find some evidence of information-based discrimination
towards Hispanics (i.e., other players perceive them as having low ability) and taste-based
discrimination against older players (i.e., other players treat them with animus). There is little in the








Discrimination features prominently in American history.  The leading target of
discrimination has been Blacks, whether in the form of slavery, Reconstruction, Jim Crow, or
other guises.  Asians have also been the target of severe discrimination historically, as have
women.  In modern society, the extent of discrimination is less clear.  Some data suggest that
discrimination may still be at work.  For instance, large racial gaps remain on many social
indicators such as income, education, and life expectancy (Blank 2001), and women continue to
earn far less than men on average in the labor force. On the other hand, legislation now  provides
legal protection against discrimination on the basis of race, gender, and age.  Along some
dimensions, discrimination appears less pronounced.  For instance, between 1970 and 1990 the
number of Black-White interracial marriages more than tripled.  In addition, women and minorities
have increasingly come to occupy prominent positions in politics, business, and the media. 
Viewed in this light, the current racial and gender economic gaps may be the consequence of past
discrimination, rather than a reflection of current discriminatory practices.
To the extent that discrimination persists, understanding the source of that discrimination is
of first-order importance.  There are two leading theories of discrimination (see Fryer 2001 for a
detailed survey).  The first theory is based on tastes, and originates with Becker (1957).  In the
taste-based story, some economic actors prefer not to interact with a particular class of people and
are willing to pay a financial cost to avoid such interactions.  The other leading explanation is
based on incomplete information.  The simplest information-based model involves one group
having mistaken beliefs about another group’s skill level and acting accordingly.  That simple
model, while perhaps a reasonable description of behavior, is not a very satisfying economic
model because it implies that individuals are making systematic errors.  A series of more
sophisticated information-based statistical discrimination models circumvent that criticism (Phelps1  For a more complete survey of the empirical literature on discrimination than is
presented here, see Altonji and Blank (1999).
2 As one vivid example, Howell and Sims (1994) analyze the Louisiana Gubernatorial
election in which White supremacist politician David Duke received far more votes than pre-
election surveys and exit polls had predicted.  Kuklinski et al. (1997), using a clever methodology
designed to minimize self-reporting issues, find no evidence of discrimination towards Blacks
outside the South, but substantial racism among White southerners.
3 Heckman and Siegelman (1992) criticize audit studies on the grounds that the simulated
discriminatory transactions that occur in audit studies would be unlikely to arise in a market
economy, i.e. Blacks may not shop for cars at all-White car dealerships because they fear being
discriminated against.  If that is the case, then in the real world, the consequences of discrimination
will be far less than suggested by the audit study.the
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1972, Arrow 1973, Aigner and Cain 1977, Lundberg and Startz 1983, Coate and Loury 1993,
Fryer and Jackson 2002).  In these models, individuals (typically employers) discriminate against
particular groups either because (1) signals of ability are less informative within that group or, (2)
in the presence of human capital investment, equilibria exist in which negative prior beliefs about
members of a particular group become self-fulfilling.  In models of statistical discrimination,
economic actors have no animus (unlike taste-based models), but discriminatory outcomes
nonetheless arise.
Measuring the extent of discrimination poses a difficult empirical challenge.1   Self-report
data are unlikely to accurately reflect attitudes if there is a perceived stigma attached to racist
views.2    A number of different approaches have been employed in an attempt to address this
question.  One method, known as the “audit study” uses matched pairs of individuals of different
races who masquerade as consumers or job hunters.3  Using this methodology, for instance, Ayres
and Siegelman (1995) find that car dealerships attempt to charge higher prices to Blacks and
women.  Bertrand and Mullanaithan (2002) find that resumes carrying distinctively Black names
are less likely to receive job interviews.  A second approach to the empirical study of4  Altonji and Pierret (2001) present a clever methodology for ferreting out statistical
discrimination using information about how wages change with employment tenure.  They find
little evidence of statistical discrimination on the basis of race.
5  After the first draft of this paper was written, it came to my attention that another group of
researchers were independently collecting Weakest Link data to answer questions about
discrimination (Antonovics, Arcidiacono, and Walsh 2002).  Their research also concludes that
there is little evidence of discrimination towards Blacks and women. They do not analyze
discrimination towards Hispanics or the elderly.
See Gertner (1993) and Metrick (1995) for other economic analyses using game shows as
a vehicle.
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discrimination is to compare salaries to marginal products of labor for Blacks and Whites.  These
studies are most commonly performed for athletes, where salaries are known and “output” is
relatively easy to quantify (e.g., Kahn 1991).  Mixed evidence of discrimination is found in this
literature, with some studies finding salary and customer discrimination against Blacks,
particularly in basketball.  Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001), analyzing outcomes of drug
searches following police stops, find no evidence of racial bias.  In general, empirical tests have a
difficult time distinguishing between taste-based and information-based models of discrimination.4
In this paper, I try to both measure the extent of discrimination and distinguish between
competing theories using an unusual data source: contestant behavior on the television game show
“Weakest Link.”5  On this show, contestants answer trivia questions over a series of rounds, with
one contestant eliminated each round based on the votes of the other contestants, until only two
contestants remain.  The last two contestants compete head-to-head for the winner-take-all prize.
Because the prize money at stake is large (as much as $190,000 on a single show), participants
have powerful incentives to vote in a manner that maximizes their chance of winning.
The total prize money is an increasing function of the number of questions that are
answered correctly over the course of the program.  As a consequence, there is a strong incentive6  The set of information about other competitors is fairly limited.  In addition to observing
the performance of each contestant in answering questions up to that point in the game, players also
announce their age, occupation, and home town.  The contestants can also see one another, and
therefore can observe race, gender, and other visual cues, such as degree of physical
attractiveness.
7  Statistical discrimination models arising as a consequence of minorities having noisier
signals will not necessarily generate this pattern.  In those models, noisy signals result in
minorities being less likely to be perceived as being in the tail of the distribution (both upper and
lower).  As a consequence, minorities may be less likely to be voted off in early rounds in such a
model.
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to vote off the least skilled players in the early rounds.6  Both taste-based and statistical
discrimination theories would predict that discrimination will manifest itself as an increased
propensity to vote off the group that is discriminated against early in the game, conditional on other
observables such as the number of questions answered correctly up to that point in the show, or the
individual’s education (which may predict future skill in answering questions).7
As the end of the show nears, however, strategic incentives switch.  The value of building
the prize pool becomes outweighed by the question of whether a contestant can beat another
contestant in a head-to-head challenge.  Ideally, one would like to be competing against a low-skill
opponent in the final round to increase one’s chance of winning the final prize.  In the late rounds,
the two theories discussed above offer different predictions about how discriminators will behave. 
In the taste-based models, those who discriminate towards a group do so not because they think
that group is less talented, but rather, because they do not like them.  Thus, one would expect that a
taste-based discriminator would continue to disproportionately vote against the target group in the
late rounds.   In information-based models, on the other hand, discriminators perceive the other
group as less qualified.  Thus, in the late rounds, such  discriminators will avoid voting for
members of the group that is viewed as less qualified, in order to raise the probability that the final8In either model of discrimination, there is another potential factor at work: losing to
someone in the target group may be especially embarrassing, increasing the inventive to eliminate
members of that group towards the end of the game.
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opponent will be from that group, increasing the perceived likelihood that the discriminator will
win the prize.  Consequently, voting behavior in the late rounds provides a unique opportunity to
empirically distinguish between the two competing models.8
There are a number of important caveats concerning the applicability of these game show
patterns to everyday behavior.   First, the setting examined is not a market.  Unlike in the real
world, the contestants have little choice with respect to whom they are interacting.  Second, the
individuals who appear on this game show are highly selected, both with respect to who applies to
be on the show and who is chosen to be on the show.  Little is known about the precise nature of
the selection process.  It is clear, however, that those who appear on the show are not
representative of the underlying populations.  For instance, the education levels of Whites, Blacks,
and Hispanics appearing the show are nearly identical, whereas there are big differences in mean
education levels for these groups in the overall population.  Third, the voting is taking place in
front of a televised audience.   Just as racist individuals lie about whether they voted for David
Duke in an exit pool, they may be loath to broadcast racist views on a television game show. 
Finally, the decision about whom to vote for depends not just on one’s own views, but also about
one’s beliefs as to how other contestants will vote.  Race may serve as a focal point in a setting in
which multiple equilibria exist, exaggerating the amount of measured discrimination. Thus,
someone who is not racist, but believes others are racist, will have incentives to vote for Blacks in
the early rounds. 
With those important caveats in mind, the empirical findings reveal little systematic6
evidence of  discrimination towards Blacks, Asians, or women.  The number of votes cast against
these groups are similar to the numbers for White males.  Hispanics and the elderly, however, do
appear to face systematic discrimination on the show.  These two groups consistently receive more
votes (which is a bad thing) early in the show than other contestants, even after controlling for
other factors such as education level and performance in answering questions up to that point in the
game.  The data are consistent with an information-based discrimination story for Hispanics.  In
the final round, Hispanics are significantly less likely to receive votes – a reversal from earlier
rounds.  For the elderly, the discrimination appears to be taste based.  Even in the final round, the
elderly receive significantly more votes than other contestants, controlling for relevant factors.   
There is also some tendency in the data for individuals to vote less frequently for members of their
own group.  For instance, women vote more frequently for men and vice-versa.  Blacks tend to
vote less for other Blacks than would be expected.  The exception to this rule is the elderly, who
are more likely to vote for other elderly than are contestants in general.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides greater
background on the television show Weakest Link.  Section III discusses in more detail the strategic
considerations players face.  Section IV presents the empirical results.  Section V concludes.
Section II: Background on Weakest Link
Weakest Link is a television game show in which contestants compete against one another
to obtain a winner-take-all prize.  Each round, contestants take turns answering trivia questions,
with the goal to build a “chain” of answers.  The more consecutive correct answers given, the
greater the prize.  Prize money builds slowly for the first few correct answers and much more9  On the prime time show, the first correct answer is worth $1,000, the next answer
$2,500, and the progression continues: $5,000, $10,000, $25,000, $50,000, $75,000, $125,000.
On the day time show, the value of answers is as follows: $250, $500, $1,000, $2,500, $5,000,
$12,500. 
10  The tradeoff involved in the decision to “bank” is that an additional correct answer has
a bigger payoff if one does not “bank,” but the cost of an incorrect answer is also greater. 
Examining contestant behavior regarding the “bank” decision is of potential interest, but my data
set does not contain information on who banked.
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quickly when many consecutive correct answer have been assembled.9  Before hearing a question,
the contestant has the opportunity to “bank” the money in the current chain.  If the contestant
chooses to “bank,” then the money assembled in the current chain is added to the final prize pool
and the team starts over in building a chain. An incorrect answer also causes the chain-building to
start over, but all of the money assembled in the current chain is lost, rather than added to the final
prize money.10  At the conclusion of each round, contestants secretly record the player who they
would like to vote off.  There is no communication between players after the conclusion of
questions and prior to the casting of the votes.  The votes, along with the identities of the
individuals casting the votes, are then revealed.  The competitor who receives the most votes is
eliminated from the show (the “weakest link”), no longer answering questions and ineligible for
the final prize.  In the case of a tie, the contestant who had the most correct answers that round (the
“strongest link”) determines which of the players with the most votes will be eliminated.  This
process continues until only two contestants remain, at which point they play one more round as a
team trying to raise the final prize (the only round in which no player is voted off), and then
compete head-to-head in a final round to determine who keeps the prize.  The winner is the
contestant that answers the most questions correctly in the final round.  If the players are tied at the
end of the final round, questions are asked until one player provides a correct answer and the other11  Toward the end of the sample, the round in which the last two remaining competitors
play cooperatively to build the pool was eliminated.  Because there is no voting in that round, it is
not used in my analysis, so the change in format is immaterial.
12  The prime time show no longer airs.  Data collection is ongoing on the day time show
and future versions of this paper will be updated to reflect the additional data.
A few shows are missing due to human error regarding recording of the shows, but data for
every show that was successfully recorded are in the sample.  There is no reason to believe that
the missing shows would exhibit any systematic bias since the outcomes of the shows are not
known at the point when the failure to record the show occurs.
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an incorrect answer.  The time devoted to answering questions decreases each round.
Two different versions of the show are included in the data set used in this paper.  The
program originally aired as a one-hour prime time show involving eight competitors, eight rounds
(seven in which one player is eliminated, and the penultimate round in which no players are voted
off), and a theoretical maximum total prize of $1 million.  Later, the show was transformed into a
syndicated 30 minute daytime show with six competitors, six rounds, and a theoretical maximum
total prize of $75,000.11  In practice, the total prize money earned is well below the theoretical
maximum. The median payout is roughly $80,000 in the prime time version, and $10,000 in the day
time version.
The data were collected by video recording the televised programs and transcribing the
results.  The data set includes almost every prime time show except for those involving celebrities
(e.g. a Brady Bunch reunion show) and virtually every day time show aired prior to January
2003.12  There are a total of 25 prime time shows and 136 day time shows.  Each prime time show
yields 8 person-level observations, 33 person-votes (eight in the first round, seven in the second
round, ..., 3 in the 6th round).  Each day time show yields 6 person-level observations, 18 person-
votes.  Thus, in total, the data set includes 1,016 person-level observations and 3,273 person-
votes.13  Because of some ambiguity in visual assessments of race, the category labeled
“Hispanic” is actually a catch-all category for non-Black, non-White, non-Asian contestants which
includes a small number of Native Americans and Pacific Islanders, as well as Hispanics.
The producers of the show appear to have made a concerted effort to include minorities on
each show.  Of 161 shows in the sample, only four lack a minority contestant.
14  Early rounds correspond to the first two rounds of the prime time show (one hour long)
and the first round of the day time show (30 minutes long).  Middle rounds correspond to rounds 3-
5 of the prime time show and rounds 2 and 3 of the day time show.  Final round corresponds to
round 6 of the prime time show and round 4 of the day time show.
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Table 1 presents summary statistics for the data set  The top panel of the panel reports data
at the contestant level.  Roughly 20 percent of the contestants are Black.  Asians and Hispanics
represent a much smaller fraction of the players (2.9 and 2.2 percent respectively).13   Players are
almost evenly distributed between males and females.  Approximately 7 percent of the contestants
are fifty years or older (the mean age is 34).  Contestant self-reports of occupation were crudely
categorized according to the likely education level of the players: high school, college,
professional school, doctorate, still in school, and unknown (assigned to those contestants whose
occupation is missing, unemployed, retired without specifying an earlier occupation, or stay-at-
home parent).  Roughly one-third of the contestants perform jobs that require no more than a high-
school education (although many of them may nonetheless have higher levels of education).  Over
forty percent are classified as college educated, with an additional eight percent having
professional degrees (e.g. law) and another 3.6 percent with doctorates (PhD or MD).
The second panel of Table 1 reports game statistics at the level of the contestant-round. 
These statistics are presented for the show as a whole, as well as for early, middle, and late
rounds of each program.14  Overall, each contestant is asked between two and three questions per
round, with that number rising in later rounds.  The success rate for answering questions is slightly
above 60 percent.15  As noted earlier, the question of whether or not to “bank” also poses a question of
decision making under uncertainty, but not one that is addressed in this paper.
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Also reported in Table 1 are statistics reporting the deviation of that player from other
contestants on the same show in the percent of questions answered correctly this round and
cumulatively up until that point in the show, as well as the number of votes for a contestant.  The
means of these variables are not themselves interesting.  By definition the mean deviation from
other players on the episode is equal to zero.  Similarly, since each player casts one vote in each
round, the mean number of votes must be equal to one.  The standard deviations of these variables,
however, will be of use in interpreting the regression estimates.
Section III: Strategic considerations of contestants
The primary strategic decision that a player faces is for whom to vote.15  The complexity of
the situation precludes a formal model.  Within each round there as many as eight contestants and
as many as seven possible targets for whom to vote.  The optimal action for any one player
depends critically on the beliefs about how other players will vote.  There is nothing a priori that
suggests that pure strategy equilibria should be the norm.  Most critically, voting behavior in every
round except the first will be a function not only of observable characteristics and performance
thus far in the game, but also of past voting.  Given that players have perhaps 30 seconds to
determine their votes after the completion of each round, it is implausible that they could perform a
rigorous optimization anyway.  Rather, they must rely on rules of thumb or subjective criteria in
determining their votes.
Absent a formal model, it is nonetheless possible to map out four broad considerations that
arise in considering how to vote.  The first consideration relates to building the size of the prize16The precise value of a correct answer varies depending on whether the preceding and
following questions are answered correctly and how frequently players “bank.” Assuming that
players are risk neutral (see Metrick 1995) and bank money optimally, a lower bound on the
expected value of a correct answer can be arrived under the assumption contestants never bank:
they simply answer questions until they complete the chain (at which time the money is
automatically banked) or until a wrong answer is given.  Assuming that the average probability of
a correct answer is .60, the expected value of a correct answer is roughly $3,500 in the prime time
show and $900 in the day time show.  For the prime time show, the payoff for eight straight correct
answers is $125,000, and the probability that any one answer is pivotal is 1/.6^7; for the day time
show, the payoff to six straight correct answers is $12,500, and the probability that any one answer
is pivotal is 1/.6^5. If banking is done optimally, a risk-neutral player will only bank if it increases
the expected value of the pool, making this a lower bound.
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pool.  Players have a collective interest in having as many correct answers as possible in order to
generate the biggest prize.  Thus, one would like to vote off players who give correct answers with
low probability.  The minimum expected value of a correct answer, assuming optimal banking
strategies, is the lowest payoff for a correct answer: $1,000 in the prime time show and $125 in
the day time show.  Back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the actual expected value of a
correct answer will be at least three times higher, since rewards rise substantially when
consecutive correct responses are tallied.16  Players who survive to the final round are on average
asked approximately 24 questions total.  Thus, differences in ability can have a substantial impact
on the final pool: thousands of dollars in the day time game and tens of thousands of dollars in the
prime time game.  The incentive to vote off poor players because of this channel is greatest in the
earliest rounds since later in the game there are fewer questions remaining to be answered, so the
opportunity cost of having a bad player alive decreases proportionally.
The second consideration when voting is the desire to eliminate strong players in order to
maximize the likelihood that you will win in the head-to-head contest in the final round.  On the
prime time show, the final round consists of five questions per player.  A contestant with a 20
percentage point edge in answering questions (e.g. 70 percent correct answers versus an opponent17  In the frequent cases in which multiple competitors tie for having the most correct
answers in a given round, the next criterion used is the percent of answers correct in that round
(i.e. players who were asked more questions are penalized).  When a tie remains, the allocation
rule used is unclear.
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with 50 percent correct) will win the final round about 80 percent of the time.  On the day time
version, the final round is only three questions which introduces more randomness, but the skilled
player continues to win the great majority of the time.  Moreover, empirically, performance in the
early rounds of the show is a powerful predictor of who will answer questions correctly in the
final round: the player with the higher fraction of questions correct going into the final round wins
64 percent of the time.   Thus, towards the end of the game, the desire to eliminate strong
competitors becomes paramount in importance.
The third consideration relates to the impact that your vote has on other’s voting behavior
towards you.  In a given round, it is dangerous to vote against players who have answered many
questions correctly and thus will be the “strongest link” and cast the deciding vote in the case of a
tie.  Given the speed with which questions are asked, as well as some apparent randomness in who
is declared the strongest link on the show, it is difficult for contestants to know precisely who the
strongest link is in any one round.17  Thus, in general there is incentive to shy away from voting for
players who have done well in this round, aside from the first two considerations discussed in the
preceding paragraphs.  In addition, in describing their motivations for why players vote for one
another, the fact that another contestant voted for them in a previous round is frequently mentioned. 
Therefore, to the extent that one is successful in voting for players who receive many votes, the
contestant increases his or her likelihood of survival.  This is both because the target of the votes
is less likely to remain alive in the next round, and because even if the target survives, if he or she
received multiple votes, retribution cannot be delivered to all of those who targeted him or her in13
the previous round. Relative to the other two channels, it is less clear how this final consideration
varies by round.  It is likely, however, that this set of concerns are of reduced importance in the
final round of voting, since there will be no later opportunity for the party voted against to exact
revenge.  In light of the tie-breaking power of the strongest link, incentive to avoid the player who
answered the most questions correctly persists in the final round (but only for the two contestants
who are not the strongest link in the last round).
The final consideration is the pressure applied by the show’s host to vote off the weakest
link.  Before each vote, the host exhorts the players to eliminate the weakest link.  Players who
vote for strong competitors rather than the weakest link are often singled out by the host in the
repartee that follows each vote.  That sort of attention is unwanted because it provides a possible
focal point for other players to coordinate their votes in the next round.  This message is most
pronounced just before the final vote, in which the host, acknowledging the importance of the
second consideration above in the late rounds, implores the contestants to “have the courage” to
vote off the weakest link.
Given the informality of the discussion above, the empirical predictions one can derive are
somewhat circumscribed.  Ignoring for the moment the third and fourth consideration
(repercussions of one’s vote and attempts at moral suasion), the prize-building channel
unambiguously weakens over time and the weak-final-round-opponent channel unambiguously
grows over time.  Both of these factors, therefore, point to an increasing tendency to vote against
stronger players over time.  At least in the final round, the third consideration (repercussion of
one’s vote) also would suggest an increased likelihood of voting against a strong player.  Only the
fourth consideration serves to moderate this tendency.  Thus, it seems plausible that in the early
rounds, the optimal strategy is slanted towards voting off weak players, whereas at the end (at14
least in relative terms), the incentives to vote off strong players are greater.
The issue of whether weak or strong players are the target is critical to differentiating
taste-based and information-based models of discrimination.  In a taste-based model, the
discriminatory behavior is not predicated on beliefs about the target of discrimination’s talent
level.  Thus, one would expect a tendency to vote against the discriminated group throughout all
rounds.  In an information-based model, on the other hand, the discrimination arises from beliefs
regarding the talent level of the discriminated group.  The discriminator believes that the target
group has lower ability, controlling for observable characteristics, and thus should be more likely
vote against that group in early rounds, but less likely to vote against that group towards the end,
when the desire to face a weak final round opponent becomes paramount.
Section IV: Empirical Results
Table 2 presents raw data on the number of votes received as a function of contestant
characteristics in early, middle, and final rounds of the game.  For the average player, one vote
would be the expectation.  Receiving a vote is a bad outcome, because the player with the most
votes is eliminated.  Comparing males and females in the first two columns, the numbers are
similar across gender in all three rounds, with women weakly less likely to receive votes at each
stage.  Thus, there is no evidence in these numbers of discrimination against women on the show. 
Comparing across races in columns 3-6, Blacks have a slightly elevated rate of vote receipt in the
early rounds, and slightly depressed rate in the middle and final rounds.  In no instance, however,
are Black and White rates statistically distinguishable.  Asians are the one group that stand out in
terms of how proficient they are in answer questions (Asians answer correctly approximately 65
percent of the time, four percentage points higher than any other racial group in the sample), so one18   The percent of correct answers is very similar for all other races.  Men are 2 percent
more likely to provide correct answers on average than women.  Contestants age 50 and over
correctly answer 2 percent fewer of their questions than the typical player.
19  The results reported are from ordinary least squares.  Negative binomial specifications
which incorporate the fact that the dependent variable is a count variable, yield virtually identical
results.
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might expect that in the raw data they would be voted off less frequently in the early and middle
rounds, but more at the end.   That pattern, however, does not appear.18 Hispanics receive high
rates of votes in the early and middle rounds, but very low rates in the final round, potentially
consistent with information-based models of discrimination.  It is important to note, however, that
there are a small number of observations for Hispanics, making the estimates imprecise. 
Contestants aged 50 and over receive excess votes at all three stages of the game, suggesting the
possibility of taste-based discrimination.
The simple statistics in Table 2 may be misleading if contestants systematically differ
along other observable dimensions such as their occupation or the skill with which they answer
questions.  Regression estimates of the following form are therefore estimated:
(1) Votecre = Xce’? + Zcre’? + ? r + ? cre
where c, r, and e index contestants, rounds, and episodes respectively.  Vote is the number of votes
a contestant receives.  The specifications include a set of fixed contestant characteristics X (such
as race, gender, age, educational level, region of residence), as well as variables that change by
round (like measures of how well the player answered questions in current and previous rounds). 
In addition, fixed effects for each round are also included, with prime time rounds and day time
rounds treated as different (i.e., there is a dummy for the first round of a prime time show and a
separate dummy for the first round of a day time show).1916
  The results of the regressions are reported in Table 3, with early, middle, and final rounds
analyzed separately.  Specifications with a minimal set of covariates are presented in the odd
columns; fuller specifications are shown in the even columns.  Before turning to the coefficients of
primary interest (gender, race, and age), it is important to first note that the conjectures regarding
player strategy are largely confirmed in the data.  In early and middle rounds, poor performance
leads to substantial increases in votes.  The inclusion of squared terms capturing non-linearities in
how voting responds to correct answers makes it difficult to interpret the raw coefficients on these
variables; evaluating the impact on votes of a player being one standard deviation above or below
the mean aids in the interpretation.  In the early rounds, a player one standard deviation below the
mean in correct answers this round receives approximately one vote more than a contestant who is
one standard deviation above the mean – a large impact given that the mean number of votes
received per round is one.  In the middle rounds, that same comparison yields a gap in votes of
.82.  In addition, in the middle rounds a contestant one standard deviation below the mean on
cumulative performance prior to this round garners an extra .25 votes relative to a player one
standard deviation above the mean.  In the final round, however, the picture is very different. 
Slightly more votes are received if one performs poorly this round (about .20, consistent with the
incentive not to vote for the strongest link in the final round because of the tie-breaking power). 
The tendency to punish bad cumulative performance disappears.  There is no difference in the
number of votes received for a player one standard deviation above and below the mean in
cumulative performance up to the final round.  Given the powerful incentive to vote off strong
players at the end, it is surprising that good players in past rounds receive the same number of
final-round votes (instead of more votes).  Either the players succumb to the host’s admonitions to
vote for the weakest player, the contestants are not very skilled at determining who the most20  This pattern is consistent with statistical discrimination in favor of those with
doctorates.
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successful player has been to date, or they (incorrectly) believe past performance is not a good
predictor of future success.
The other strategic variable in the regression, the cumulative number of opponents voted
for who are still alive, captures the “revenge” motive.  This variable enters with the expected sign
in all three parts of the game and is statistically significant in the middle and final rounds.  Each
extra opponent how you unsuccessfully tried to vote off in the past translates into between .09 and
.27 extra votes against you in the current round.
The coefficients on education (not presented in the table) provide further confirmation of
the shift in voting behavior in the final round.  The only education category that consistently differs
from the others is doctors.  Controlling for other factors in the regressions, players with a
doctorate receive substantially fewer votes than any other education category in early rounds
(about .25 less per round), but receive more votes than any other category in the final round (about
.15 votes more on average).  This result is consistent with players perceiving that these highly
educated contestants are strong players, even after controlling for observed performance up to this
time.20  Overall, the models are not particularly successful in explaining voting patterns, with R2
values ranging from .013 to .387.
For the most part, the regression results with respect to gender, race, and age mirror the
findings that appeared in the raw data.  In all specifications, women receive weakly fewer votes
than men (the omitted category), although in no case is the difference across gender statistically
significant.  The differences between Blacks and Whites (the excluded group) fail to follow a
systematic pattern and are never statistically significant.  The Asian coefficients continue to be21  It certainly does not appear from the results of the head-to-head competition that
competitors have private information about the likely success of Hispanics and old players in the
final round.  Hispanics win three of their five head-to-head opportunities, whereas old contestants
are just one for seven in winning the final round.
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inconsistent with either model of discrimination.  In the early and middle rounds, both Hispanics
and older contestants carry  positive coefficients.  Because of large standard errors, the
coefficients are statistically different than zero only in the middle rounds.  These estimates are,
however, substantively quite large: an otherwise average contestant attracts a 30-40 percent
increase in votes by virtue of being Hispanic or old.
Perhaps the most interesting finding in the paper, once again mirroring the raw data, is the
stark difference in the votes received by Hispanics and the old in the final round.  While caution is
warranted given the imprecision of the estimates, it is nonetheless intriguing that Hispanics carry
an economically large coefficient of -.35 in the final round.  Although this estimate is not
statistically distinguishable from zero at the .05 level, it is statistically different from the
coefficient on Hispanic in the middle rounds, suggesting a reversal in voting behavior towards
Hispanics over the course of the game.  These parameter estimates are consistent with statistical
discrimination towards Hispanics: other players have low expectations about the skill of Hispanic
competitors, even controlling for occupation, age, and performance during the game. In stark
contrast, older players continue to attract excess votes in the final round.  The persistent
punishment of older players throughout the course of the game is consistent with a taste-based
model of discrimination.21 
Table 4 explores the sensitivity of these conclusions to various permutations of the data. 
Only the coefficients on the gender, race, and age variables are reported in Table 4.  Results are
again shown separately for early, middle, and final rounds.  The first column simply reports the22  While explicit collusion against minorities is not at odds with either model of
discrimination, the mechanism underlying explicit collusion is very different from that of
individual-level discrimination, so it is useful to try to distinguish the two.
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baseline results presented in columns 2, 4, and 6 of the preceding table.  Columns 2 and 3 of Table
4 divide the sample into day time and prime time shows.  The same general pattern of results
appears in both sets of shows, although individual coefficient estimates become imprecise,
especially for the prime time show which has fewer observations.  Column 4 eliminates
approximately 20 percent of the shows in which explicit collusion may have been present, as
evidenced by blocks of  players voting for exactly the same progression of competitors in the
initial rounds of the program.22  The similarity of voting may, however, simply have arisen by
chance, making this a crude indicator of explicit collusion.  There are few systematic differences
relative to the baseline estimates.  The final two columns of Table 4 allow the impact of race and
age to vary by gender.  The omitted category is White males.  The coefficient reported in the
female row corresponds to White females.  Imprecise estimates make it difficult to draw strong
inferences, but the results do little to change the basic conclusion that there is little evidence of
discrimination against women, Blacks, or Asians, but potential discrimination against Hispanics
and older players.
An important consideration in whether one interprets the voting pattern data above as
discriminatory or not, depends on whether these traits (such as Hispanic or old) are indeed
predictive of future performance, conditional on other observable characteristics.  Table 5 reports
results relating player attributes to success in answering questions.  The first three columns show
results for early, middle, and final rounds respectively.  In the last column, the dependent variable
is an indicator corresponding to whether a contestant wins the head-to-head finale, conditional on23  Only rarely do Asians and Hispanics have a chance to vote for members of their own
group, so they have been combined with Whites in this analysis.
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making it that far.  All the regressions control for education level and region of residence, as well
as the cumulative percentage of correct answers given up to the current point in the game and that
value squared.  In no case is the coefficient on Hispanic statistically significant in Table 5,
although it is negative in three of the four columns.  Interestingly, the coefficient for those over age
50 is negative in all four columns, and very large and statistically significant in the last column. 
Controlling for other factors, old players do extremely poorly in the head-to-head finale.  That
result makes it even more striking that old players are voted off more than expected in the final
round of voting – basic strategy would predict the opposite.  Few other coefficients are
statistically significant in this regression, except for past performance, which is highly predictive
of future performance.
The analysis above, by focusing on overall voting patterns, may overlook discrimination by
particular sub-groups towards other sub-groups.  For instance, discrimination by Whites against
Blacks might be disguised if Blacks rarely vote for one another.  To examine that hypothesis
further, Table 6 breaks down players into three dichotomous sets of groups by race, gender, and
age.23  The voting patterns within these groups are reported in the table.  Rows correspond to the
group casting votes; columns are the group being voted for.  The odd columns of the table present
the actual frequency with which votes are cast.  The even columns reflect the predicted frequency
under the null hypothesis that votes are cast randomly.  Entries on the diagonal, which are of
greatest interest, are boxed in bold.
The results with respect to race once again show little evidence of discrimination.  Non-
Blacks are slightly more likely to vote for Blacks than would be predicted by chance, but this21
difference is not statistically significant.  Blacks vote for other Blacks somewhat less than would
be expected (.208 vs .242), but again the difference is substantively small and not statistically
significant.  There is little evidence of discrimination against Blacks by males or females, the old
or the young.
There is stronger evidence with respect to gender.  Women are about 6 percentage points
more likely to vote for men; men are 3 percentage points more likely to vote for women.  In both
cases, one can reject the null hypothesis of no gender bias at or near the .05 level.  Because the
contestants are almost equally balanced between men and women, however, the two biases largely
counterbalance one another and there is little aggregate evidence of discrimination.  If, however,
the relevant group was dominated by men (e.g. high-ranking managers in many companies), gender
bias of this sort could have an important negative impact on women.
Finally, with respect to voting against the old, both young and old contestants are more
likely to vote against old competitors.  Indeed, old players show an even stronger propensity to
vote against other old contestants, although this coefficient is imprecisely estimated due to the
small number of cases in which old players have the opportunity to face one another.
Section IV: Conclusions
Using the unique institutional set-up of Weakest Link, this paper tests for the presence and
type of discrimination.  Perhaps surprisingly, no evidence of discrimination towards Blacks or
women is found, whereas there is substantively large magnitudes of observed discrimination
towards Hispanics and the elderly.  The data are consistent with statistical discrimination toward
Hispanics and taste-based discrimination toward the old.  There is also evidence that women tend
to vote more frequently for men and vice-versa.  It is important to emphasize, however, that22
characteristics such as race, gender, and age do not appear to be the primary determinants of
voting behavior.
Given the highly stylized nature of the interactions on this television show, one must use
extraordinary caution in trying to draw general conclusions from these results.  Indeed, one could
imagine that the absence of observed discrimination towards Blacks in this artificial context might
arise precisely because of the presence of real-world discrimination towards Blacks which has
sensitized Americans to the importance of not appearing outwardly racist, regardless of inward
beliefs.  At some conscious or unconscious level, contestants may shy away from targeting Blacks
on a nationally televised program.  In contrast, players may be less concerned about appearing to
target Hispanics and the elderly. Ideally, one would like to isolate real-world settings in
which the strategic incentives flip as they do on Weakest Link to provide a more readily
generalizable test of competing theories of discrimination.Table 1: Summary Statistics
Contestant-level variables
(N=1,016) Overall Early rounds Middle rounds Final round
Black .198   (.399) ---- ---- ----
Hispanic .022   (.146) ---- ---- ----
Asian .029   (.167) ---- ---- ----
Female .503   (.500) ---- ---- ----
Old (age>49) .070    (.257) ---- ---- ----
Education=high school .344   (.475) ---- ---- ----
Education=college .421   (.494) ---- ---- ----
Education=post-college
professional school
.084   (.277) ---- ---- ----
Education=doctorate .036   (.187) ---- ---- ----
Education=Still in school .076   (.265) ---- ---- ----
Education=Uncertain .038   (.192) ---- ---- ----
On primetime show? .197   (.398) ---- ---- ----
Contestant-round-level
variables (N=3,273) Overall Early rounds Middle rounds Final round
Questions asked 2.62   (.62) 2.49   (.56) 2.63   (.58) 2.93   (.74)
Questions correct 1.66   (.91) 1.63   (.89) 1.64   (.90) 1.78   (1.01)
Percent correct this round
(deviation from episode avg.)
.00    (.28) .00    (.30) .00     (.27) .00   (.26)
Cumulative % correct (dev.
from episode avg.)
.00   (.16) .00   (.10) .00   (.21) .00   (.12)
Votes for contestant 1.00   (1.20) 1.00   (1.43) 1.00   (1.11) 1.00   (.76)
Cumulative opponents voted
against who are still alive
.40   (.66) .06   (.24) .53   (.69) .79   (.84)
Number of observations 3,273 1,191 1,599 483
Notes: The top panel of the table presents contestant-level variables; the bottom panel presents contestant-round
level variables.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.  Early rounds correspond to the first two rounds of the
prime time show (one hour long) and the first round of the day time show (30 minutes long).  Middle rounds
correspond to rounds 3-5 of the prime time show and rounds 2 and 3 of the day time show.  Final round
corresponds to round 6 of the prime time show and round 4 of the day time show.  Average votes are equal to one
in all rounds because each player casts one vote per round.  The cumulative percent correct variable captures the
deviation in percent correct for this player up to this point in the game, relative to the mean percent correct for all
players on that episode.Table 2: Raw Data on Votes Received by Race, Gender, and Age of Contestants
Round
Contestant characteristics:
































































Notes: Values in the table are the mean number of votes cast for contestants in the race and gender category named, by rounds of the
game.  On average, players will receive one vote per round.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  The number of observations is
presented in brackets.  Early rounds correspond to the first two rounds of the prime time show (one hour long) and the first round of
the day time show (30 minutes long).  Middle rounds correspond to rounds 3-5 of the prime time show and rounds 2 and 3 of the day
time show.  Final round corresponds to round 6 of the prime time show and round 4 of the day time show.Table 3: Regression Analysis of Votes Received
Variable
Early rounds Middle rounds Final round















































































































No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of obs. 1,191 1,191 1,599 1,599 483 483
Notes to table 3: The dependent variable in all columns is the number of votes received by a contestant in a given
round.  The unit of observation is a contestant-round.  Estimation is done with ordinary least squares.  Standard
errors, clustered by episode and round, are in parentheses.  All regressions include an exhaustive set of
interactions controlling for round*show-length interactions.  The even columns include state of residence fixed
effects and occupation dummies, but these coefficients are not reported in the table.  Early rounds correspond to
the first two rounds of the prime time show (one hour long) and the first round of the day time show (30 minutes
long).  Middle rounds correspond to rounds 3-5 of the prime time show and rounds 2 and 3 of the day time show. Final round corresponds to round 6 of the prime time show and round 4 of the day time show.Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis of the Key Coefficients








Early rounds (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)   Male (6)  Female
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Middle rounds Male Female


























































Final round Male Female


























































    Notes: The baseline specification in column 1 corresponds to the results reported in columns 2, 4, and 6 of
Table 3.  All other columns adopt identical specifications, except for the differences noted.  Columns 2 and 3 of
this table divide the sample into prime time and day time shows.  Column 4 drops roughly 20 percent of the sample
in which there is a possibility that explicit collusion occurred between some set of the players.  Columns 5 and 6
show results allowing the effects of race and age to vary by gender.  The omitted category in these regressions is
White males.  The coefficient reported for female in column 6 is for White females.  Standard errors, clustered byepisode and round, are in parentheses.Table 5: Do Observable Player Characteristics Predict Future Success in Answering Questions?
Variable
Dependent variable: Percent of answers correct this round Dependent variable:
Winner in head-to-
head finale




































































Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 1,191 1,599 483 322
Notes: The dependent variable is named at the head of the column.  Columns 1-3 correspond to the percent of
correct answers in a given round as a function of observable characteristics and percentage of questions answered
correctly thus far in the show.  The final column corresponds to an indicator variable for whether a contestant wins,
conditional on making it to the final round.  Standard errors, clustered by episode and round, are in parentheses.Table 6: Propensity to Vote for Contestants of a Particular Race, Gender, or Age
(By Contestant’s Own Race, Gender, and Age
Characteristic of the contestant
that is voting
Likelihood of voting for a contestant with the following characteristic:
(standard error in parentheses)
Black Female Old
Actual Predicted if vote
randomly
Actual Predicted if vote
randomly










































































Notes: Values in the table are the actual and predicted probabilities that votes cast by contestants of a particular group identified by rows of the table
will be for contestants of the group identified in columns of the table.  Predicted probabilities assume that players vote randomly among all eligible
competitors.  The values in the table exclude the final round of voting because strategic incentives are reversed in the final round.  Standard errors, in
parentheses, are computed under the  null hypothesis of random voting.  Cases in which all of the remaining competitors are in the target group, or noneof the remaining competitors are in the target group are excluded from the calculations.References
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